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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the slowly developing expansion of deceit liability, whether at
common law or under the securities Acts. As the professional
accountant assumes increased importance in the business world,
he must expect to be required to conform to proportionately
increased standards.52
Torts: Negligence in Failure to Use Seat Belts
Plaintiff, an automobile passenger injured in a rear-end col-
lision, sought recovery from her host, who was driving the fol-
lowing vehicle, the driver of the preceding vehicle, and a
stranded motorist who had allowed his headlights to shine across
the highway in such a manner as to blind oncoming drivers.
The trial court rendered judgment apportioning liability among
the three drivers.1  On appeal,2 defendants assigned as error,
inter alia, the refusal of the trial judge to submit to the jury
the question of whether plaintiff was negligent in failing to
use an available seat belt. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held
that failure to use an available seat belt was a breach of the
common law duty of due care and the question of whether such
breach was a substantial factor in -producing the injury was
for the jury.3  However, the court stated that failure to in-
struct on that issue was not error where no evidence had been
introduced to establish a causal relationship 4 between the pas-
senger's injuries and the failure to use seat belts. Bentzler v.
Braun, 149 N.W.2d 626 (Wis. 1967).
Thirty-two states and the District of Columbia now require
some form of seat belt installation in passenger cars.5 However,
52. See Levy, Legal Hazards in Public Accounting, 99 J. AcCOUiNT-
ANCy 37 (1955).
1. Plaintiff was awarded damages in the amount of $37,855.90.
This amount was apportioned as follows: 27.5% from the driver of the
preceeding vehicle, 45% from plaintiff's host, and 27.5% from the
stranded motorist.
2. Plaintiff's host did not appeal.
3. Strictly speaking, this ruling may not constitute the holding
since it does not follow directly from the verdict. However, for pur-
poses of precedent, this is the important holding of the case. See
Cierpisz v. Singleton, 230 A.2d 629, 633 (MId. 1967).
4. The court determined that proof of a failure to "buckle-up"
was not sufficient to prove causation of plaintiff's injuries. 149 N.W.2d
at 640-41.
5. 2 TrIAL 36 (1966). All of the statutes are recent, none having
been enacted prior to 1960. For a comparative analysis of seat belt leg-
islation, see Motor Vehicles-A Comparative Analysis of Seat Belt Leg-
islation, 14 DEPAuI. L. Rev. 152 (1964). See also 32 Fed. Reg. 2408
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no state requires that they be used after installation.6 Indeed,
in two states, Tennessee and Virginia, the statutes specifically
provide that failure to use or wear seat belts should not be
considered negligence,7 and Iowa, Minnesota, and Maine provide
by statute that evidence of the use, or lack of use, of seat belts
shall not be admissible at trial.8 No previously reported decision
has found any common law duty to use available seat belts9 and
(1967) which provides that after January 1, 1968, seat belts shall be
provided for all passengers.
6. See Walker & Buck, Seat Belts and the Second Accident, 34
INs. CouNsE J. 349 (1967); Note, Torts-Failure To Fasten Seat Belts
Not Contributory Negligence, 69 W. VA. L. REv. 387 (1967). The closest
to such a requirement is a Rhode Island statute requiring that
Every jitney, bus, private bus, school bus, trackless trolley
coach, and authorized emergency vehicle, when operated upon
a highway, shall be equipped with a driver's seat safety belt
device.... Every person when driving any such vehicle shall
use and have his body anchored by such seat safety belt.
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 31-23-41 (Supp. 1966). This enactment, how-
ever, has no application to the drivers of passenger cars.
7. TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-930 (Supp. 1966); VA. CODE AN. §
46.1-309.1 (1967).
8. IOWA CODE § 321.445 (1965); M . REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1368A
(Supp. 1966); MINN. STAT. § 169.685 (Supp. 1966).
9. See The Seat Belt Defense, DEFEN E RESEARCH INSTITUTE, (Sep-
tember 1967). Only four reported decisions preceeded the Bentzler
case. In Sams v. Sams, 247 S.C. 467, 148 S.E.2d 154 (1966), the court
indicated that defendant should be allowed to prove that the failure of
plaintiff to use a seat belt constituted contributory negligence.
In Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1966), and Lipscomb v.
Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914 (Del. 1967), the respective courts stated that the
question of whether failure to use available seat belts constitutes negli-
gence is better left to the legislature. See 16 DEPAUL L. REV. 521 (1967);
18 MERCER L. REV. 511 (1967); 69 W. VA. L. REV. 387 (1967).
In Kavangh v. Butorac, 221 N.E.2d 824 (Ind. App. 1966), the court
held that it was not negligence, as matter of law, for one to fail to fas-
ten seat belts; Hustad v. Refuse Removal Serv., 227 A.2d 433 (Conn.
Super. 1967), dealt with the question of whether the seat belt defense
is a question of law.
Two Wisconsin Circuit Court juries, Busick v. Budner, Cir. Ct. Mil-
waukee Co., Civil No. 381-602 (Wis. Dec. 1965); Stockinger v. Dunish,
Cir. Ct. Sheboygan Co. (Wis. 1964), apparently did find the plaintiff
negligent for failing to use an available seat belt, but these findings
were based on a statutory construction, not on the common law. In
Stockinger, noting that the Wisconsin statutes required seat belts be
"installed for use," the trial judge instructed: "It ... must follow that
the legislature intended that these seat belts be used in certain circum-
stances." The Defense Forum: Seat Belts, 5 FOR THE DEFESE 78 (1964).
The Bentzler Court repudiated this approach when it stated:
It seems apparent that the Wisconsin legislation, which does
not require by its terms the use of seat belts, cannot be con-
sidered a safety statute in the sense that it is negligence per se
for an occupant of an automobile to fail to use available seat
belts.
149 N.W.2d at 639.
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the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Bentzler, apparently became
the nation's first appellate court to find either a statutory or a
common law duty to use them.10
The Bentzler court conceded that the statute requiring in-
stallation of seat belts did not require their use." Nonethe-
less, it identified a common law duty to use available seat
belts grounded on two basic premises: first, the duty of a pas-
senger in an automobile to care for his own safety and, second,
the common knowledge 2 that seat belts provide an additional
safety factor for the passenger. Inherent in both premises
was the assumption that a reasonable, prudent man in plaintiff's
circumstances is cognizant of the merit of using a seat belt and
will do so as a matter of ordinary care. However, despite a
heavy reliance upon statistics purporting to show the general
merit of seat belts, the court expressed the caveat that such
statistics cannot be used to predict the effect seat belts would
have in a particular accident situation.' 3  Therefore, the ques-
tion Bentzler would leave to the jury is whether the plaintiff's
failure to use the seat belt was a substantial factor in causing
the injury.14
BentzZer, however, would not leave the jury completely free
to speculate on this issue, for part of the defendant's burden
of proof would be to show that plaintiff's injuries would in
fact have been reduced by use of the seat belt. Absent such
proof, the Bentzler court would refuse to give the question of
plaintiff's negligence to the jury.
The proposition that an automob7e passenger has a duty to
care for his own safety has been generally accepted.' 5 However,
the court's second premise, that it is common knowledge that
10. With regard to harnesses, in Vernon v. Droeste, Cause No.
17,205, Dist. Ct. of Brazos County, Tex. (June 9, 1966), a Texas jury
found that plaintiff's failure to wear a safety harness with which the
car was equipped was contributory negligence. Seat Belt Liability:
Texas, 7 FoR THE DEFENSE 49 (1966). The case has apparently not been
appealed.
11. 149 N.W.2d at 639. See Wis. STAT. § 347.48 (1965).
12. As an appendix to the decision -there is a two page excerpt
from the Wisconsin Law Review statistically supporting the conclusion
that seat belts are, on the whole, safety devices. See Roethe, Seat Belt
Negligence in Automobile Accidents, 1967 'Wis. L. REv. 288.
13. 149 N.W.2d at 640.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Powell v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 150 So. 2d 179 (Ala.
1962); Mignery v. Gabriel, 2 App. Div. 2d 218, 154 N.Y.S.2d 85, aff'd, 3
N.Y.2d 1001, 147 N.E.2d 480, 169 N.Y.S.2d 91.3 (1956); Watters v. Parrish,
252 N.C. 787, 115 S.E.2d 1 (1960).
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seat belts provide an additional safety factor for the passenger,
is not free from doubt. The question of whether seat belts do, in
fact, add to passenger safety is not entirely settled. Another
court, facing the question only months before Bentzler, found
this question in a "state of quandary."' 6  Legal writers have
challenged the propriety, in light of the limited state of present
knowledge, of taking judicial notice of the fact that seat belts
are safety devices.' 7  Articles in medical journals have pointed
to the fact that positive injury can be caused by the use of seat
belts,"' and some independent researchers have concluded that
seat belts can cause more rather than fewer injuries in many
crash situations.' 9 Insofar as the opinion in the instant case
ignored such factors, its analysis is open to question.
Moreover, even if the court could be sure that a fastened
seat belt is more frequently a positive safety device, it might
still be difficult to find a duty to use the seat belt. The court
in Bentzler pointed out that the test of a passenger's negligence
is whether he acted as a reasonable man would have acted under
the circumstances. 20  The court went into a detailed analysis of
whether, on the average, seat belts are safety devices, but it re-
ferred to none of the available studies on the frequency with
which people customarily use seat belts although custom is one
material factor in creating a reasonable standard of conduct.2'
16. Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So. 2d 49, 51 (Fla. 1966).
17. Kleist, The Seat Belt Defense-An Exercise in Sophistry, 18
HAsTInGs L.J. 613 (1967); Note, Seat Belts and Contributory Negligence,
12 S.D.L. REv. 130 (1967).
The same article from which the court obtained statistics pointing
to the safety of seat belts did, however, caution that the available sta-
tistics are "not entirely clear-cut." Roethe, supra note 12, at 296.
18. E.g., Fletcher & Brogden, Seat-Belt Fractures of the Spine and
Sternum, 200 J.A.M.A. 167 (1967); Howland, Curry & Buffington,
Fulcrum Fracture of Lumbar Spine, 193 J.A.M.A. 240 (1965); Tolins,
An Unusual Injury Due to the Seat Belt, 4 J. TRAUMA 397 (1964); Wil-
liams, Lies & Hale, The Automotive Safety Belt: In Saving a Life May
Produce Intra-abdominal Injuries, 6 J. TRAUMA 303 (1966).
See Seat Belt Trauma, NEWSWEEK, June 19, 1967, at 92, wherein
after a study of seat belt caused injuries, doctors concluded that both
lap and shoulder harnesses should be redesigned. It should be noted
that most of the medical writers, while pointing to the injuries caused
by the seat belt, assert that patients may have received different or
more serious injuries if the seat belt had not been used.
19. One researcher, after conducting intensive auto safety studies,
summed up the value of seat belts as follows: "If one can select the
type of accident to become involved in, wear a seat belt. If not, a seat
belt can be the primary cause of injury or death." A.J. WroTE, PAssEN-
GER CAR DYNrIAcs 383 (1965).
20. 149 N.W.2d at 640.
21. Although the standard of the reasonable man is not solely de-
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If the court had faced this question, it would have found
that only the most recent and optimistic studies report that as
many as fifty per cent22 of those who have seat belts regu-
larly use them.23  Indeed, the chief article from which the
Bentzler court gathered its statistical information asserted that
the public has not yet accepted the seat belt as a useful safety
device.2
4
Thus, not only did the instant court create a common law
duty on the strength of a questionable fact finding, but it
failed to analyze the important question of whether the ordinary
and prudent man was aware of this fact and would premise
his conduct upon it. In short, instead of applying an accepted
standard, the Bentzler court has imposed a new standard of
pendent on custom, it is relevant as an indication of community judg-
ments and expectations. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF
TORTS 1227, 1229 (1956); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 153, 154 (3d ed.
1964); Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 1147 (1942).
22. A Joint Study by the California Highway Patrol and Automo-
tive Crash Injury Research of Cornell University, cited at 14 DEPAur_ L.
REV. 152, 158 (1964); Roethe, supra note 12, at 288; Liability: Fasten
Your Seat Belt, TiME, July 22, 1966, at 46.
Although a poll taken by the Auto Industries Highway Safety Com-
mittee, reported in Best's Weekly News Digest, October 26, 1965, indi-
cated that 76% use seat belts on long trips, this figure is somewhat mis-
leading since 3 out of 4 traffic deaths occur within 25 miles of the vic-
tim's home. Use Those Seat Belts in the City Too, 54 Sci. DIGEST 66
(1963).
23. The reported percentages of motorists who actually use seat
belts do not include those motorists who own cars not equipped with
seat belts. Therefore, the portion of the total population which actu-
ally uses them is apparently quite small. A study cited in the Seat Belt
Defense, supra note 9, indicated that while 52% of the cars surveyed
had seat belts only 37.3% of the owners with seat belts always used
them. On the basis of this survey then, less than 20% of the car own-
ers regularly wear seat belts. The report of the above study does claim
a high percentage of "sometime" use, but makes no attempt to show
how regular or prolonged is this "sometime" use. A 1966 report of the
National Safety Council, cited in Cainazzo & Flynn, The Failure to Use
Seat Belts as a Basis for Establishing Contributory Negligence, Barring
Recovery for Personal Injuries, 1 U. S.u FRAWN. L. REV. 277 (1967),
shows that only 16% of all passenger car occupants use seat belts.
24. Roethe, supra note 12, at 296. Two months after Bentzler, the
Maryland Supreme Court held that failure to fasten seat belts could in
some cases constitute negligence. However, the court also stated:
We do not adopt, at this time, the Wisconsin court's statement
that "an occupant of an automobile either knows or should
know of the additional safety factor produced by the use of seat
belts." We are persuaded, for the present at least, that the
[above cited] statement in Roethe, Seat Belt Negligence in
Automobile Accidents . . . is a more accurate appraisal of the
status of seat belts in the "mind of the public ..




Another question, more difficult than these factual ques-
tions ignored by the court, is the question of proof. The present
state of medical knowledge renders it virtually impossible to
determine, with any degree of certainty, the probable physical
injuries that would have resulted even if the "negligent" plain-
tiff had been wearing a seat belt.26 In view of this general in-
ability to accurately allocate the damages between those caused
by the negligence of the defendant in precipitating the colli-
sion and those caused by the plaintiff in failing to use the seat
belt, the courts are faced with a number of alternatives.
Following the Bentzler rationale, future courts may elect
to place this burden of proof on the defendant. This pro-
cedure would bring a result consistent with the modern trend in
tort law which allows recovery for injuries negligently caused.2
However, it would be inconsistent with the court's analysis re-
specting the source of plaintiff's duty to "buckle-up," rendering
meaningless the proposition that failure to fasten the seat belt
can be a bar to recovery. Conversely, the court could shift the
burden of proof to the plaintiff. This approach, however, of-
fends any sense of justice, since it would mean that a party
injured entirely through the negligence of another could be
denied recovery in toto because he failed to take a precaution
that might, in some cases, either have reduced the level of his
injury or caused a different type of injury.28
As a third alternative, a court faced with the injustice and
impracticability of placing the burden on either the plaintiff or
defendant and with the fact that proof is often impossible in
this area might allow the jury to speculate as to which injuries
were caused by the negligence of each of the parties. However,
25. See Roethe, supra note 12, at 297.
26. Kleist, supra note 17, at 615; Roethe, supra note 12, at 299; 9
ARiz. L. REv. 118, 121 (1967).
In Cierpisz v. Singleton, 230 A.2d 629 (Md. 1967), the court held
that plaintiff who was thrown into the air, struck the rearview mirror
with her forehead, and cut her face on the dashboard when she came
back down was not guilty of contributory negligence since the defend-
ant was unable to offer any positive proof that plaintiff would not have
sustained the same injuries had the seat belt been fastened.
27. Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, 160 N.E.2d 43, 188 N.Y.S.2d 491, cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 374 (1958); Wolfstone, Imputation of Contributory
Negligence, 1 PERSONAL INJURY IfrfAnn 241 (C.E.B. 1966), cited in
Kleist, supra note 20, at 617. See generally 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
supra note 21, § 22.8, at 1221; W. PROSSER, supra note 21, § 64, at 430.
28. See authorities cited note 18 supra; cf. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
supra note 21, § 22.10.
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this approach, expressly rejected by -the Bentzler court, is simply
too foreign to our system of justice to be seriously considered.20
Thus, none of the available methods of placing the burden
of proof seems to bring a satisfactory result. Arguably the
dilemma is not insolvable, but unless the courts find a satis-
factory solution to this type of case, or unless medical tech-
nology becomes sophisticated enough to separate the injuries,
the proposition that failure to fasten available seat belts can con-
stitute negligence must remain either meaningless or unjust.
Beyond the problems of fact amd proof involved in the
instant court's decision, there are broader problems of basic
public policy. By declaring that failure to fasten seat belts con-
stitutes negligence, the court reached a decision contrary to the
present trend in tort law. Generally, in order to further the
social policy of compensating for loss, the courts have expanded
the concept of negligence, while at the same time restricting the
concept of contributory negligence. 30  However, the Bentzler
rationale would create a new defense, thereby expanding the
concept of contributory negligence. Standing alone, this re-
sult does not form a ground for criticism, but it does suggest
that the policy basis of the Bentzler decision warrants close
scrutiny.
Theoretically, the Bentzler result might not work any great
injustice in Wisconsin, or in the five other states which adhere
to the doctrine of comparative negligence. 3' Under Wisconsin's
comparative negligence statute, the defendant is liable only to
the extent he is judged to be at fault, and the plaintiff must
bear responsibility to the extent of. his own assessed fault.32
However, if the majority of states which still adhere to the
doctrine of strict contributory negligence should adopt the rea-
soning in Bentzler, the result would be horrendous. 33 A plain-
tiff who in no way contributed to the collision would be denied
29. E.g., West v. United States, 246 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1957); Ward-
well v. George H. Taylor Co., 333 Mass. 302, 130 N.E.2d 586 (1955).
30. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 21, § 22.10; see note 27
supra.
31. Only six states have comparative negligence statutes: Arkan-
sas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1730.2 (1947); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 105-
603 (rev. 1956); Mississippi, Mss. CODE ANN. § 1454 (1942); Nebraska,
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (rev. 1964); South Dakota, S.D. CODE § 47.034-
1 (Supp. 1960); and Wisconsin, Wis. STA'r. § 95.045 (1965).
32. W. PROSSER, supra note 21, § 66.
33. See Kleist, supra note 17; Walker & Buck, supra note 6; Note,
Seat Belts and Contributory Negligence, .2 S.D.L. REV. 130 (1967).
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recovery for any part of his injuries. 34 Moreover, this result
would fail to provide any additional incentive for due care on the
part of the defendant.35 Recognition of these objections may
explain why four states have legislatively determined that
failure to fasten a seat belt shall not constitute contributory
negligence, while no states have spoken for a contrary posi-
tion.36
It is suggested that there are existing legal rationales where-
by a Bentzler-type common law duty to "buckle-up" could be
established in states adhering to the doctrine of contributory
negligence, without unfairly depriving plaintiffs of all recovery.
One such rationale might be through an adaptation of the doc-
trine of avoidable consequences. Generally, this doctrine is
based on the rationale that plaintiff has a duty to reasonably
minimize whatever damages might be caused by the defendant.37
Since plaintiff's "negligence" in the seat belt cases relates only
to his own injuries, it can be argued that the avoidable conse-
quences doctrine, which likewise relates only to a self-imposed
aggravation of plaintiff's injuries, should be applied to the seat
belt cases to deny recovery for those specific damages which
could have been avoided by the use of a seat belt.
However, the doctrine of avoidable consequences has gen-
erally been applied to plaintiff's actions taken after the acci-
dent,38 whereas a seat belt defense would require action by the
plaintiff before he has any notice of defendant's negligence. 39
In addition, even if the doctrine were stretched to apply to
plaintiff's pre-accident conduct, the proof of causation is so dif-
34. For a discussion of the problem of the relative fairness of the
comparative versus contributory negligence doctrines, see Body, Com-
parative Negligence: The View of the Trial Lawyer, 44 A.B.A.J. 346
(1958).
35. It is true that defendant cannot know, prior to the collision,
whether his victim will be "buckled-up." Hence, there may be no pri-
mary impact upon the deterrence of defendant's negligence. However,
a policy which immunizes an actor from any responsibility for his neg-
ligence cannot provide a positive incentive for careful and prudent con-
duct-an end which seems worthy of consideration. See W. PROSSER,
supra note 21, § 3, at 1091.
36. See notes 7 & 8 supra.
37. W. PROSSER, supra note 21, § 64, at 433-34; F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, supra note 21, § 22.10, at 1231-34. Tennessee, by statute, pro-
hibits the use of the doctrine. TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-930 (Supp. 1966).
38. W. PROSSER, supra note 21, § 64, at 433.
39. See Bertz, Seat Belt Liability, 7 FOR T=E DEFENSE No. 2 (1966);
Seligson, Seat Belt Liability III, 8 FOR Tim DEFENSE No. 3 (1967); Note,
Automobile Seat Belts: Protection for Defendants as Well as For Motor-
ists?, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 733 (1965).
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ficult in this sort of case that much unfairness could result.
Under the traditional analysis of the rule of avoidable conse-
quences, if the injuries caused by t;he defendant and the self-
imposed negligent aggravation by the plaintiff cannot be sep-
arated, the plaintiff's negligence will bar all recovery.40 This
results notwithstanding the fact that defendant's negligence was
the sole proximate cause of the accident. 41 Moreover, any
jurisdictions strongly committed to the defense of contribu-
tory negligence as a complete bar to recovery are unlikely to
accept the avoidable consequences rationale in the seat belt
cases. If contributory negligence was not to be a complete bar
in the seat belt situation, it would logically follow that it should
not be a complete bar in other negligence cases in which
the plaintiff, by his own action, causes a part of his own injury.
Another legal rationale that might be applied to obtain a
Bentzler result would be to contend that plaintiff, whenever he
rides in an automobile without fastening his seat belt, assumes
the risk of sustaining injuries over and above those he would
have sustained had the seat belt been fastened. Under this ap-
proach, plaintiff would be barred from recovering those specific
damages resulting from this voluntary assumption of risk.
This approach might find some analogous support from the Mor-
tenson4 2 case which recognized that a jury could find negligence
in failure to equip a truck with seat belts because it was rea-
sonably foreseeable that anyone entering upon the highways of
California might be involved in an accident. However, this ap-
proach is repugnant to the established tort policy that plaintiff
may rely on the supposition that other motorists will drive with
ordinary care and that plaintiff need not guard against some-
one else negligently initiating an accident.
43
A third approach might be to recognize that, in fact, two
accidents are involved in any seal, belt litigation: the "first
accident," the collision, and the "second accident," the impact of
the plaintiff against some of the interior portions of the car or
the plaintiff's being thrown out of the vehicle.44 After the cau-
40. W. PROSSER, supra note 21, § 64.
41. Id.
42. Mortensen v. Southern Pac. Co., 245 Cal. App. 2d 241, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 851 (1966).
43. See, e.g., Berkstresser v. Voight, 63 N.IM 470, 321 P.2d 1115
(1958); Miller v. Treat, 57 Wash. 2d 524, 358 P.2d 143 (1960); W.
PROSSEP, supra note 21, § 67.
44. See generally R. NADAR, UNSAFe; AT ANY SPEED (1965); Walker
& Buck, supra note 6; Note, Seat Belts and Contributory Negligence, 12
S.D.L. REv. 130 (1967).
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sation of the first accident had been determined and damages
assessed, the court could then proceed to the second accident.
If the plaintiff's unfastened seat belt constituted contributory
negligence in regard to the second accident, he would be denied
recovery for damages caused by such accident. The present
adoption of this approach would mean, in most cases, that plain-
tiff would be allowed recovery, if he were the owner of the car,
for the property damage caused by defendant's negligence, and
denied recovery for those personal injuries partially caused by
his failure to fasten his seat belt. While this approach would
not fully compensate plaintiffs who fail to "buckle-up" it at
least would serve to mitigate the effects of a doctrine which,
when strictly applied, would bar all recovery.
45
Weighing against any general acceptance of the Bentzler
result, even in such modified forms, is the equitable considera-
tion that allowing the seat belt defense would put an undesir-
able burden on those who enter automobiles. The Bentzler
court itself admits that the seat belt statistics cannot serve to
predict the extent or gravity of a particular plaintiff's injur-
ies. 40 Given this, and the further fact that the passenger has
no way of knowing whether in his case fastening the seat belt
will increase or decrease his potential injuries,47 it seems un-
fair to require the passenger to "buckle-up" or risk losing all
compensation for his injuries.
If, as some courts have suggested, the time arrives when
failure to fasten a seat belt should be considered contributory
negligence, that decision is probably better left to the legisla-
tures. 48 Because of their superior investigative facilities, they
are arguably better equipped to make the inherently difficult
factual determinations and are thus in a better position to de-
fine the standard of conduct most appropriate to the seat belt
cases.
45. For arguments suggesting the unimportance of providing com-
pensation for property damage, see R. KEETON & K. O'CONNELL, BASIC
PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIc VIcTIm 136, 276 (1965).
46. 149 N.W.2d at 640.
47. See text accompanying note 19 supra. One value of the fas-
tened seat belt appears to be its effectiveness in reducing head injuries.
However, while protecting the head, the seat belt can literally break
the passenger's back. Supra note 18. Admittedly, a head injury may
be potentially more serious. But the individual may, for reasons per-
sonal to him, prefer to take a chance on his head rather than on his
back. In this situation it seems most unfair that he should be denied
recovery for the head injury simply because he chose to protect his back.
48. See Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914 (Del. 1967); Brown v.
Kendrick, 192 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1967).
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